Sugar & Water

Water Grabbing in the Wami-Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania

Today we will look at a specific case study around the practice of ‘water grabbing’ in the Wami - Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania - one out nine river basins in Tanzania and located in the eastern part of the country.  More specifically, we will look at the sugar company Mtibwa Sugar Estates Ltd. (MSE), which has been extracting water from the river basin for commercial irrigation and has significantly impacted local water resources and surrounding villages.

MSE is the single largest water user in the Wami-Ruvu river basin and a research study in 2014 (van Eeden et al. 2016) has shown that MSE have been using water beyond their allocated amount.  

The sugar company has constructed a weir and an irrigation canal in the Diwale River (which flows into the Wami River) in order to alter the characteristics of the river flow to its advantage: By ‘opening and closing the weir to meet their irrigation demand, often for months on end, regardless of the needs of downstream users’ (van Eeden et al. 2016, 617). Even MSE technicians confirmed that in order to properly irrigate the sugar plantation, the weir would have to be kept closed for up to two months. This misuse of power and ignorance towards downstream users has led to conflicts with local communities and pastoralists, who have tried to fight for a reliable water supply by mobilising social power (van Eeden et al. 2016, 617).

The marginalising impacts of this ‘water grab’ on local communities can be illustrated by looking through the theoretical lens of one particular ‘power of exclusion’ (Hall et al. 2011) – regulation.

The legal foundations of land ownership play a fundamental role in how inequalities in water access arise: The allocation of land and water use permits rely on legal rights, that are usually not available to rural local communities (van Eeden et al. 2016, 609).  This will put them in a very disadvantaged position opposed to powerful corporate actors, who have the means to negotiate their way around inconvenient regulations.  As in this case, in which MSE holds the water permits to use the water, the local population lacks ‘the legal footprint to stand their ground against large scale water users’  (van Eeden et al. 2016, 609). Even though there are regulations in place, that should prevent the overuse of water (as in the case of MSE), there are several reasons why authorities have been quite reluctant to intervene. First, the ownership structure of MSE has prevented the government of Tanzania to get involved in current conflicts. In 1998, the government of Tanzania owned 25% of the shares of MSE, but sold them back to MSE (in the context of sugar sector privatisation) (van Eeden et al. 2016, 618).  Secondly, the fact that MSE is having good relations with the ex-president of Tanzania backs their powerful position. Third, WRBO (Wami-Ruvu River Basin Office) has been incapable to properly monitor water use and issue penalties on overuse of water allocations, very likely due to the powerful status of the large-scale user MSE.  This leads to the ironic situation that regulations – whether implemented or circumvented- will benefit the powerful agent and work as an exclusive force towards the powerless.

References:

Hall, D.; Hirsch, P. and Murray Li, T. 2011. Powers of exclusion: Land dilemmas in Southeast Asia. Singapore: NUS Press.

Van Eeden, A.; Mehta, L. and van Koppen, B. 2016. Whose waters? Large-scale agricultural development and water grabbing in the Wami-Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania. Water Alternatives 9(3): 608-626